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INTRODUCTION
The uneasy juxtaposition of cynicism and trust presents one of
the most interesting and profound conundrums in political and con-
stitutional theory. The conundrum is that both cynicism and trust
seem vital to the long-term viability of a democracy, despite the fact
that they appear to be mutually exclusive concepts.
Trust requires a firm belief in the honesty, reliability, and integ-
rity of another person or institution. According to Francis Fukuyama,
"[t]rust is the expectation that arises within a community of regular,
honest, and cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms
... .,, Trust increasingly is viewed as essential to prosperity and social
stability. Trust fosters the growth and development of social capital,
which is critical to economic development.2
By contrast, cynicism entails denying the sincerity of the motives
or actions of others. By negating trust, cynicism prevents people from
forming what Robert Putnam has described as "civic communit[ies],"
f J. DuPratt White Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
1 FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY
26 (1995).
2 James S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital 94 AM.J. Soc. S95,
S117-18 (1988).
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or communities based on connections other than kinship.3 Cynicism,
which manifests itself in the systematic distrust of institutions, causes
people to be less civic-minded, less well-informed about current
events, and less inclined to vote or otherwise participate in political
life.4. When cynicism manifests itself in this way, it can undermine
democratic institutions and lead to fundamental instability.
But it is wrong to assume that cynicism has no place in a well-
ordered constitutional system. In fact, the opposite is true. Cynicism
about governmental abuse of power as well as the tendency of interest
groups to influence and control government inspired the Framers. In
fact, a dominant theme of The Federalist Papers is "the desirability of
adopting the Constitution as a means of controlling interest groups."5
In The Federalist No. 10, James Madison "expressly embraced the no-
tion that what would separate his constitution from those that had
gone before it would be a more realistic [i.e., cynical] conception of
human nature."'6 As I previously observed:
The problem confronting the Framers was that, on the one
hand, they did not want to organize another monarchy, but on the
other hand, the earlier democracies had all been abject failures,
nothing less than 'spectacles of turbulence and contention.'
Madison's view was that the problem with previous democracies had
lain in the assumptions made by their organizers. Specifically, prior
to the Federalists' construction of our political regime, 'the whole
of political thought had turned on ways to inculcate virtue in a small
class that would govern.' In stark contrast, the government that
Madison had in mind (and the one that ultimately emerged) would
be based on the [cynical] assumption that the postconstitutional
world would be populated by people motivated by self-interest
rather than by virtue.7
The Framers frankly and self-consciously took the view that they had
to construct the Constitution to deal with the corruption and inepti-
tude of the leaders who would govern the postconstitutional order.
The Framers' distrust and suspicion of government was due in
large part to their understanding of history. They also had an intui-
tive sense of the power of public choice theory, which models the po-
3 ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WOiKc CMc TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY
88 (1993).
4 See id. at 90-107.
5 Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpreta-
tion: An Interest Group Model 86 CoLumT. L. REv. 223, 243-44 (1986).
6 Jonathan R. Macey, Competing Economic Views of thw Constitution, 56 GEo. WAsH. L.
Rgv. 50, 55 (1987).
7 Id. at 56 (citing THE FEDERAIST No. 10, at 61 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961)); see Irving Kristol, "The Spirit of '87", 86 PUB. INT. 3, 3 (1987); Daniel Patrick
Moynihan, The "New Science of Politics" and thw Old Art of Government, 86 PUB. INT. 22, 23-24
(1987).
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litical process as a negative-sum game in which politicians compete to
supply powerful special interest groups with private benefits in ex-
change for political support.8 In simple terms, the Framers' approach
was to hope for virtue, but to expect and plan for corruption and self-
interest. They organized the Constitution around this cynical
perspective.
In this Article I reconcile the apparent tension between the Fram-
ers, who take a cynical perspective on government, and those who ob-
serve that trust and social capital are critical to social stability and
economic welfare. The reconciliation derives from the realization
that cynicism about government can coexist alongside tremendous
faith and respect for private ordering, particular private institutions,
and certain political institutions as well. Indeed, this coexistence is
the key to understanding the American experience.
To illustrate the point, one need only contrast the reverence ac-
corded the Constitution with the widespread public cynicism towards
Congress. Furthermore, cynicism about government has become a fa-
vorite topic of the media, which seems to find a larger audience for
stories of governmental corruption and ineptitude than for stories
about honest, hard-working government officials laboring anony-
mously to serve the public interest. By now, cynicism about govern-
ment is also featured in popular discourse. Currently, it is difficult to
find anyone outside of academia prepared to defend an activist regu-
latory state per se. We have reached the strange state of affairs in
which transfer programs and government safety nets remain ex-
tremely popular with targeted groups, while even the programs' bene-
ficiaries view the agencies that administer them with distrust and
suspicion.
The reality is that government actually works, at least sometimes.
There is certainly strong disagreement about how often government
programs work and how much the government can be expected to do.
Nonetheless, the proposition that government programs never work is
demonstrably false, just as there is no merit to the claim that govern-
ment programs always work as well as one might hope.
One reason that richer theories of the regulatory state are neces-
sary is that the extant theories are not particularly well specified. Gov-
ernments have a tremendous amount of power. And, while it is
certainly true that governments often abuse their power, it is also true
that at least occasionally they do not. Researchers should focus their
attention on the conditions and circumstances under which govern-
8 See generally Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REv. 339
(1988) (providing an overview of public choice theory).
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ment can be made to serve the public interest, not the narrow inter-
ests of bureaucrats and special interest groups.
A second reason that new theories of the regulatory state are nec-
essary is that governments differ dramatically from country to country
and even within countries. For example, the United States govern-
ment sometimes appears to embrace an "invisible hand" model, in
which it views its role as enabling markets to function more efficiently
by minimizing externalities, reducing transaction costs, and providing
aid to businesses. 9 On the other hand, critics of the political process
perceive the government as using its power simply to transfer wealth
from the politically powerless to more powerful constituents who are
well positioned to provide benefits to the government.10
This Article is divided into three parts. In Part I, I elaborate on
Timothy Frye and Andrei Shleifer's useful taxonomy of how bureau-
crats and markets interact." Frye and Shleifer argue that govern-
ments come in three forms. Some governments use their power to
correct market failures, supply public goods, and enforce contracts.
Other governments use their power to help businesses. Still other
governments use their power to enrich themselves and their friends at
the expense of the public interest. While their taxonomy is informa-
tive, I argue that particular governments can, and often do, use their
power in all three ways simultaneously. Working within this frame-
work, I articulate an account of the roles played by both trust and
cynicism in the construction of a civil society.
In Part II, following the Framers' cynical lead, I build on the an-
cient medieval principle known as Occam's razor to formulate a new
logical principle with which to analyze competing theories of govern-
ment. Occam's razor, sometimes referred to as the principle of parsi-
mony, provides the basis for all scientific modeling and theory
building. Occam's razor dictates that when multiple explanations for
the same data are possible, researchers should always select the sim-
plest explanation. 12 Similarly, "Macey's razor" dictates that when mul-
tiple explanations for the same governmental action exist, researchers
should always select the most cynical explanation for that action.
Just as Occam's razor may seem trivial, Macey's razor may seem
too cynical. However, in the same way that modern science would be
impossible without Occam's razor, the study of governmental
9 See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962).
10 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Property, Speech, and the Politics of Distrust, 59 U. Cm. L.
REv. 41, 56 (1992) (suggesting that the proper way to better a "wasteful political system in
decline" is to "reduce the power of government to transfer wealth and dispense favors").
I1 See Timothy Frye & Andrei Shleifer, The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand, 87
AM. ECON. REv. 354 (1997).
12 See Francis Heylighen, Occam's Razor, at Principia Cybernetica Web, http://
pespmcl.vub.ac.be/occamraz.html (last modified July 7, 1997).
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processes will be improved both quantitatively and qualitatively if re-
searchers adhere to Macey's razor. In developing Macey's razor, I
point out that all governments attempt to persuade people that they
act virtuously and charitably to the extent that they can. Yet the asym-
metry between the level of information possessed by the government
and the population as a whole, coupled with a host of other collective
action problems, makes it difficult for people to accurately assess the
efficacy and honesty of government. Therefore, public perception of
government will almost certainly be either overly cynical or insuffi-
ciently cynical. Given the existence of such systematic error, it is bet-
ter for people to believe that government is worse than it actually is.
Put differently, even if it were true that people are "too cynical"
about government, it is by no means obvious that such cynicism is a
bad thing. It might even be a good thing if popular distrust forces
governmental actors to bear a heavier burden of persuasion when de-
signing and implementing new programs. I argue that such cynicism
can compensate, to a modest extent, for the lack of market discipline
that typically characterizes government action. Indeed, cynicism is
simply another form of dissent that shifts the burden of proof to the
government to justify its actions.
In Part III, I argue that contestability is necessary to induce politi-
cal actors to work for the public interest rather than for themselves.
Specifically, I argue that governmental officials will be more accounta-
ble and responsive to the public interest when there is pressure to
perform arising from the contestability of their jobs. For a job to be
contestable, there must be (a) an unbiased, widely available source of
information about what the government is doing, (b) some mecha-
nism by which this information can be integrated into a political
agenda, and (c) a low-cost mechanism for replacing bureaucrats, poli-
ticians, and other public officials who fail to serve the public
interest. 13
Contestability is vitally important to good government. But con-
testability is not possible without public cynicism toward government.
Similarly, the widely acclaimed system of divided government champi-
oned by the Framers reflects a deep cynicism about government.
From these two observations, it is easy to demonstrate that Macey's
razor will improve the quality of government because it requires lob-
byists, bureaucrats, and other governmental actors to do a better job
of justifying their policies. Moreover, I will demonstrate that the
13 Cf Enrico Colombatto & Jonathan Macey, Information and Transaction Costs as the
Determinants of Tolerable Growth Levels, 155 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 617,
620-26 (1999) (arguing that developed countries produce higher rates of growth because
their societies have civil liberties, which, in turn, make politicians' jobs contestable).
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Framers adhered to the principles behind Macey's razor when design-
ing the Constitution for the new American republic.
I
INVISIBLE, HELPING, AND GRABBING HANDS
Entrepreneurs generate wealth. Bureaucrats "merely" transfer
wealth. Because the actions of bureaucrats affect the incentives that
face entrepreneurs, the interaction between bureaucrats and entre-
preneurs is vitally important. Frye and Shleifer present three models
that describe these interactions: the "invisible-hand" model, the "help-
ing-hand" model, and the "grabbing-hand" model:
Under the invisible-hand model, the government is well-organized,
generally uncorrupt, and relatively benevolent. It restricts itself to
providing basic public goods, such as contract enforcement, law and
order, and some regulations, and it leaves most allocative decisions
to the private sector....
.... Under the helping-hand model ... bureaucrats are inti-
mately involved in promoting private economic activity: they sup-
port some firms and kill off others, pursue industrial policy, and
often have close economic and family ties to entrepreneurs....
In the final, grabbing-hand[ ] model, government is just as interven-
tionist, but much less organized, than in the helping-hand model.
The government consists of a large number of substantially inde-
pendent bureaucrats pursuing their own agendas, including taking
bribes. 14
A number of interesting insights emerge from this taxonomy.
First, according to Frye and Schleifer, there is a direct correlation be-
tween the level of government activity in the economy and the
amount of corruption. 15 Their assumption is that as regulations be-
come more oppressive, regulated firms will be more inclined to pay
bribes in order to avoid difficult regulations, requirements, and
fines.16 Needless to say, this is a highly cynical, though accurate, vi-
sion of government.
Another interesting feature of the Frye-Shleifer model is that the
authors appear implicitly to assume a close correlation between pri-
vate-sector corruption and public-sector corruption. The idea is that
each government official is a potential bribe-taker. As the number of
potential bribe-takers increases, so too will the number of bribes. 17
While this analysis seems correct in the case of a corrupt government,
14 Frye & Shleifer, supra note 11, at 354 (citations omitted).
15 See id. at 354-55.
16 See id at 357.
17 See id (citing Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Corruption, 108 Q.J. EcoN. 599
(1993)).
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if one assumes that government actors have an incentive to be honest,
the notion that the number of governmental actors corresponds to
the incidence of corruption seems dubious. For example, one would
assume that overall corruption would decrease if we were to increase
the number of federal judges and Department of Justice officials ex-
amining official corruption (although this does not appear to have
been the case during the Clinton administration).
The Frye-Shleifer conclusion is that bigger government means
more corruption. 18 This inevitably leads to the conclusion that the
invisible-hand model of government is preferable because it facilitates
relatively little corruption. The invisible-hand form of government is
followed qualitatively by the helping-hand form of government, which
exhibits organized corruption, and finally by the least desirable grab-
bing-hand form of government, which exhibits disorganized corrup-
tion. In fairness to Frye and Shleifer, their argument is limited to
governments in transition. 19 And, while they may be right in this lim-
ited context, it is by no means certain that their theory has more gen-
eral applicability.
Of course, the size of government is not the only thing that af-
fects the level of corruption in a society. The presence or absence of
professional norms also will play a pivotal role in determining whether
an administrative agency will be plagued with corruption. As James Q.
Wilson observed in his classic study of government:
In a bureaucracy, professionals are those employees who re-
ceive some significant portion of their incentives from organized
groups of fellow practitioners located outside the agency. Thus, the
behavior of a professional in a bureaucracy is not wholly deter-
mined by incentives controlled by the agency .... Because the be-
havior of a professional is not entirely shaped by organizational
incentives, the way such a person defines his or her task may reflect
more the standards of the external reference group than the prefer-
ences of the internal management.20
In other words, the professionals who control policymaking
within government bureaucracies are constrained by the institutional
norms of the bureaucracy as well as the norms of their particular pro-
fession. Environmental engineers at the Environmental Protection
Agency are inclined to adopt engineering solutions to problems, while
lawyers within the agency are more likely to adopt an approach that
permits them to utilize their legal skills. The lawyers' orientation re-
flects not only the lawyers' desire to utilize their professional training
18 See id. at 354.
19 See id.
20 JAMES Q. WILSON, BuREAucRAcy: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Do AND WHY THEY
Do IT 60 (1989).
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and experience, but in many cases, also reflects "their desire to use
the skills they develop... to land ajob with a well-paying, prestigious
law firm."2 1
The point here is that corruption is not the only thing that causes
government actors to deviate from pursuing action that furthers the
public interest. Bureaucrats and other governmental actors have com-
peting visions of the public good, and these competing visions reflect
distinct professional cultures and their human capital investments in
training. While bureaucrats often personally benefit from bringing
their own professional norms to bear on policy issues, such personal
benefit is not necessary for bureaucrats to skew policy decisions to-
ward their own personal perspectives. Rather, bureaucrats act the way
they do because they have been socialized, or programmed, to inter-
nalize the norms of their external professions. Not surprisingly, this
internalization creates tension within bureaucracies, as lawyers, engi-
neers, economists, and other professionals lobby to have agencies dis-
charge their duties in the way that best reflects the norms of their
respective professions. 22
If we apply the Frye-Shleifer taxonomy to a modern welfare state
such as the United States, we see that all three models operate simulta-
neously. When government auctions the spectrum to the highest bid-
ders or uses tradeable permits to control pollution, it is conforming to
the invisible-hand model. When government provides subsidies to
businesses and advocates enterprise zones, it acts according to the
helping-hand model. When government officials trade political favors
for campaign contributions, they conform to the grabbing-hand
model.
Cynicism serves the salutary purpose of maximizing the incidence
of government action that conforms to the invisible-hand model be-
cause voters in a democracy generally will not tolerate corruption.
Moreover, cynicism induces citizens to be on their guard against cor-
ruption, thereby raising the probability of detecting such activities.
The argument is even more persuasive when compared to possi-
ble alternative approaches. For example, one might simply reject the
possibility that government actors might be corrupt, but this would be
counterfactual and irrational. Alternatively, one could accept the fact
of government corruption in the abstract, but reject the possibility
that American bureaucrats and politicians are corrupt. While it cer-
tainly seems true that bureaucrats and politicians are no more corrupt
in the United States than in other countries, there is certainly no rea-
son to believe that corruption and self-interest are absent from the
21 Id
22 Id. at 60-61.
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American political scene. And once we recognize that corruption (or
even the unconscious promotion of one's own world-view) is possible,
it seems that cynicism about governmental action is warranted be-
cause it leads to greater vigilance.
In other words, once we recognize the possibilities of self-interest
and corruption, cynicism about government can lead to better govern-
ment, while eliminating cynicism can only lead to reduced monitoring
of governmental action, and consequently more bad government. Af-
ter all, the opposite of cynicism is naivet6, and it is impossible to imag-
ine that naivet6 about government can generate good public policy
outcomes.
A. Cynicism and the Courts
Frye and Shleifer present an interesting examination of the effec-
tiveness of the court systems in Moscow and Warsaw.23 If government
is working properly, courts are an effective device in resolving disputes
that arise between private parties and the government as well as
among private parties. Frye and Shleifer argue that when government
is corrupt, courts are rarely used because parties are unlikely to
achieve a just resolution of their disputes.24 Conversely, they posit
that when government is not corrupt, private parties will have faith in
the court system and increase their use of the courts. 25 This depiction
is not entirely accurate. Frye and Shleifer are correct that, as corrup-
tion declines, people will increase their use of the courts to defend
government-granted rights such as property rights, freedom of assem-
bly, and freedom of the press. However, if government misbehavior
manifests itself in empire-building and turf-grabbing, private parties
may be forced to utilize the courts to confront the bureaucrats. For
example, Frye and Shleifer found that fifty-seven percent of the Mos-
cow shops they surveyed had hired legal counsel (compared to only
thirty-six percent in Warsaw, which is relatively less corrupt).26 The
most likely explanation for this result is that "lawyers are needed in
Russia to deal with bureaucrats." 27
Of even greater concern are the ramifications of James Q. Wil-
son's work addressing the influence of culture and beliefs on human
behavior. In particular, Wilson documented how professional norms,
cultures, and belief systems of governmental actors affected their pol-
icy decisions. 28 Applying this analysis to the legal profession, it is easy
23 Frye & Shleifer, supra note 11, at 355-57.
24 Id. at 355-56.
25 Id. at 356.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 WILSON, supra note 20, at 50-71.
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to demonstrate that lawyers who become judges are likely to believe
that legal solutions, engineered through the prodigious use of lawyers
and litigation, are the best way of engineering solutions to whatever
conflicts arise among litigants. Judges are likely to believe more
strongly in the social value of law and lawyers than most people.29
Thus, when people lack cynicism about government at the same
time that lawyers, judges, and government bureaucrats believe that
they can help people by increasing overall levels of regulation and
litigation, productive activity in general and wealth creation in partic-
ular are stifled. Cynicism about the efficacy of government serves as
an invaluable antidote to the natural proclivities of governmental ac-
tors to pursue their own highly programmed (and often skewed) vi-
sions of the public good.
B. Cynicism and Activist Government: Transaction Costs and the
Hidden Agenda
To the extent that cynicism about government leads to caution
about accepting the common liberal nostrum that government pro-
grams accomplish their ostensible objectives, cynicism can be viewed
as a transaction cost that impedes the expansion of government.
Those who prefer to see the level of governmental activity increase
will, of course, oppose cynicism. This hidden agenda should be ex-
posed, and those who oppose cynicism should explain the basis for
their opposition. The motives of those who favor cynicism are quite
clear: we think the burden of persuasion should rest firmly on the
shoulders of those who favor expanding the size and scope of
government.
While promoting cynicism has obvious appeal to libertarians and
conservatives who favor a smaller role for government, cynicism
should also attract those eager to utilize the government's power to do
good. This is because cynicism will not only reduce the size and scope
of government, but also will improve the quality of government pro-
grams by forcing bureaucrats to adhere to higher standards when de-
signing and implementing legislative programs.
In the private sector, a wide variety of devices are available to en-
sure that products and services are of a high quality. In particular,
competition in product markets, capital markets, labor markets, and
perhaps above all, the market for corporate control, works to ensure
that managers and workers do their best to offer high-quality products
and services at low costs. Unfortunately, in the public sector, it is
much more difficult to identify the constraints that deter politicians
29 For an analysis of how the process of preference formation begins during law
school, see Jonathan R. Macey, Civic Education and Interest Group Formation in the American
Law Schwo 45 STAN. L. REv. 1937 (1993).
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and bureaucrats from engaging in corrupt or selfish policies. Even
worse, collective action problems, such as rational ignorance, cause
citizens in democracies to tolerate poor governmental performance
until it becomes rational for voters to displace the incumbents.30
One way that government can convince people that it is doing a
good job is to produce economic prosperity. Prosperity signals the
electorate that government policies are working.31 But few would ar-
gue that merely contributing to (or more accurately, not impeding)
the growth of the private sector provides a sufficient basis for ap-
plauding the actions of government. Unfortunately, the other goals
that government attempts to achieve, such as promoting a more just
and equitable society, providing greater opportunities for the disad-
vantaged, reducing externalities, promoting social cohesion and soli-
darity, and reducing suffering, are much more difficult to monitor.
Because government operations are often difficult to observe, "the
problem of moral hazard arises: the [government bureaucrat] may
shirk or subvert" her publicly articulated tasks.32 To the extent that
people are cynical about the performance of government, they will do
a betterjob of monitoring governmental actors, thereby ensuring that
such actors perform better.
It seems clear that the least advantaged and most vulnerable
members of society should be encouraged to express the most cyni-
cism about government. These are the people least able to monitor
governmental actors and exert a controlling influence on the behav-
ior of politicians. Cynicism about the motives of governmental actors
is likely to benefit these groups disproportionately.
The larger point here is not that government is always bad. The
idea is simply that government is not always good. As discussed below,
it takes little or no effort to organize a government in which politi-
cians and bureaucrats act with the purest of motives. The challenge is
to organize a government populated by ordinary people with ordinary
human frailties. Approaching government with a healthy dose of cyni-
cism is the appropriate weapon for dealing with this challenge. The
benefits of such an approach are enormous, while the costs are trivial,
if not negligible.
30 See Pierre Salmon, Democratic Governments, Economic Growth, and Income Distribution,
in UNDERSTANDING DEMOCRACY 144, 147, 153 (Albert Breton et al. eds., 1997).
31 See Colombatto & Macey, supra note 13, at 621.
32 WILSON, supra note 20, at 159.
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C. The Role of Trust
Cynicism about government creates much needed space within
society for private virtue33 by creating a demand for the development
of social capital. Social capital is the ability of people to work together
for common purposes through the medium of non-governmental
groups and organizations.34 This is the most important, and certainly
the most constructive role that cynicism plays in civic life. The more
people distrust government, the more they will be forced to invest in
social capital by trusting each other instead. As Fukuyama observed:
The concept of human capital, widely used and understood among
economists, starts from the premise that capital today is embodied
less in land, factories, tools, and machines than, increasingly, in the
knowledge and skills of human beings.... [I]n addition to skills
and knowledge, a distinct portion of human capital has to do with
people's ability to associate with each other, that is critical not only
to economic life but to virtually every other aspect of social exis-
tence as well. The ability to associate depends, in turn, on the de-
gree to which communities ... are able to subordinate individual
interests to those of larger groups. Out of such shared values comes
trust, and trust... has a large and measurable economic value.3 5
Government certainly has a role to play in enforcing contracts
and maintaining social order. But government is not enough. In
Fukuyama's words, "reciprocity, moral obligation, duty toward com-
munity, and trust" are equally critical to ensure the proper function-
ing of democracy and capitalism.3 6
Unfortunately, dependence on government eliminates people's
incentives to invest in social capital. For example, Edward Banfield
observed that in the Italian village of Montegrano during the 1950s,
wealthy residents were unwilling to provide badly needed institutions
such as schools and hospitals although they clearly had the resources
to do so. The town's reluctance to fund these facilities arose from a
conviction that it was not their responsibility, but the state's responsi-
33 Thoreau argues that a lack of cynicism for government detracts from moral virtue,
observing that "[l]aw never made men a whit more just; and, by means of their respect for
it, even the well-disposed are daily made the agents of injustice." HENRY DAVID THOREAU,
THE VARIORUM CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 33 (Walter Harding ed., Twayne Publishers 1967)
(1866).
34 See Coleman, supra note 2, at S98-S100; see also Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone:
America's Declining Social Capital 6 J. DEMOCRACY 65, 67 (1995) ("[S]ocial capital refers to
features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coor-
dination and cooperation for mutual benefit.").
35 FuKuyAmA, supra note 1, at 10 (citations omitted).
36 It- at 11.
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bility to finance these institutions.37 By undermining citizen depen-
dence on government, cynicism thus creates a forum for virtue.38
At the outset of this Article, I noted the odd juxtaposition of cyni-
cism and trust, and observed the paradox that both cynicism and trust
seem vital to the health of society. Now we can see that there is a
symbiotic relationship between cynicism and trust: cynicism about the
state makes room for civic virtue and private philanthropic initiative.
Nowhere is this unlikely relationship more readily observable
than in the United States. Cynicism about government is reflected in
this country's "strong antistatist tradition, evident in the relatively
small size of the American public sector when compared to virtually
all European nations, and in opinion polls that show Americans ex-
pressing decidedly lower levels of confidence in and respect for gov-
ernment than do citizens of other industrialized nations. '3 9 Many
have observed the apparent anomaly that alongside the American
public's unusual hostility to government regulation, taxation, govern-
ment oversight and intrusion, and state ownership of productive re-
sources, is the public's equally distinctive ability to create and
maintain "very large, cohesive private organizations." 40 Both Alexis de
Tocqueville and Max Weber remarked on the huge success of volun-
tary associations in America.4' Of particular relevance is de Toc-
queville's famous observation:
Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions constantly
form associations. They have not only commercial and manufactur-
ing companies, in which all take part, but associations of a thousand
other kinds, religious, moral, serious, futile, general or restricted,
enormous or diminutive. The Americans make associations to give
entertainments, to found seminaries, to build inns, to construct
churches, to diffuse books, to send missionaries to the antipodes; in
this manner they found hospitals, prisons, and schools. If it is pro-
posed to inculcate some truth or to foster some feeling by the en-
couragement of a great example, they form a society. Wherever at
the head of some new undertaking you see the government in
France, or a man of rank in England, in the United States you will
be sure to find an association. 42
37 See EDWARD C. BANFIELD, THE MORAL BASIS OF A BAcKWARD SocIErY 30-31 (The
Free Press 1965) (1958).
38 Goldhagen notes that although German society was heavily and-Semitic, by readily
following the Nazi movement, citizens "subscribed to the underlying Nazi model of Jews
and ... were 'Nazified' in their views of Jews," losing what social virtue they had. DANIEL
JONAH GOLDHAGEN, HITLER'S WILLING EXECUTIONERS 87 (1996).
39 FUKUYAMA, supra note 1, at 51 (citations omitted).
40 E.g., id.
41 Id. at 50.
42 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 114 (Phillips Bradley ed., Vin-
tage Books 1945) (1835).
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A central insight of this Article is that there is a causal connection
between American's cynicism about government and their skill at vol-
untary association. Put plainly, cynicism about government does not
mean the abandonment of faith in and dependency on institutions.
In fact the opposite is true; cynicism requires the construction of alter-
native institutional arrangements.
Cynicism about government has given rise to the image of the
American as rugged individualist. But the American penchant for as-
sociational life has always counterbalanced these individualistic ten-
dencies. 43  Francis Fukuyama has observed the interesting
juxtaposition between American individualism and the American
penchant for communal arrangements:
Although Americans commonly characterize themselves as individu-
alistic, most serious social observers have noted in the past that the
United States historically has possessed many strong and important
communal structures that give its civil society dynamism and resili-
ence. To a greater degree than many other Western societies, the
United States has a dense and complex network of voluntary organi-
zations: churches, professional societies, charitable institutions, pri-
vate schools, universities, and hospitals, and, of course, a very strong
private business sector.44
By contrast, the absence of cynicism about government leads to
the destruction of a civil society characterized by voluntary associa-
tions. For example, socialism requires a complete lack of cynicism
about government. One cannot be cynical about government and si-
multaneously support state ownership of the means of production, as
well as the government's plenary authority to make capital allocation
decisions. And, as Fukuyama has observed, "[p] erhaps one of the
most devastating consequences of socialism as it was actually practiced
in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was the thorough destruction
of civil society that took place there, a destruction that has hampered
the emergence of both working market economies and stable
democracies. '45
Voluntary associations, including small businesses, family farms,
unions, churches, newspapers, and the myriad of voluntary associa-
tions, all subtly compete with the state as sources of authority. That is
why "[t]he Leninist state set about deliberately to destroy all possible
competitors to its power."46 When people lose their cynicism about
the state and come to depend entirely on the government, they lose
their public-spiritedness as well.
43 See FuKuYA iA, supra note 1, at 283.
44 Id. at 50.
45 Id. at 54.
46 Id. at 54-55.
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II
MACEY'S RAZOR
The considerable benefits associated with adopting a cynical ap-
proach to government lead inexorably to the principle of Macey's ra-
zor, which, in turn, owes a large intellectual debt to the principle of
Occam's razor. As noted above, Occam's razor holds that when scien-
tists are forced to choose between competing plausible explanations
for a particular data set, they should select the simplest explanation.47
According to Francis Heylighen:
[This] principle is absolutely essential for model building because
of what is known as the "underdetermination of theories by data."
For a given set of observations or data, there is always an infinite
number of possible models explaining those same data. This is be-
cause a model normally represents an infinite number of possible
cases, of which the observed cases are only a finite subset. The non-
observed cases are inferred by postulating general rules covering
both actual and potential observations.
For example, through two data points in a diagram you can
always draw a straight line, and induce that all further observations
will lie on that line. However, you could also draw an infinite variety
of the most complicated curves passing through those same two
points, and these curves would fit the empirical data just as well.48
In this situation, Occam's razor instructs researchers to select the sim-
plest explanation for the relationship, which, in this case, is the
straight line representing the linear relationship among the data
points. 49
Macey's razor holds that when more than one explanation for the
same governmental action is possible, policy analysts should always se-
lect the most cynical explanation for that action. The most cynical
explanation for a governmental action is the one that presumes that
such action is motivated by the private interests of the groups affected
by the action, rather than by public-spirited motives. Thus, when a
particular governmental action ostensibly serves some public interest,
but also can be explained on other, more cynical grounds such as
bureaucratic turf-building, or successful "rent-seeking"50 by a special
interest group, Macey's razor holds that the more cynical explanation
47 Heylighen, supra note 12.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Rent-seeking refers to the lobbying process by which special interest groups at-
tempt to procure legislation that transfers wealth (economic "rents") in excess of what the
members of such groups could earn in the competitive marketplace to themselves from the
public at large. For a discussion of rent creation, rent-seeking, and an introduction of the
concept of "rent extraction," see FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS,
RENT EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION 7-13 (1997).
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should be considered first. Generally speaking, while some believe
that government regulation is designed to cure market failures and to
solve other problems that cannot be redressed by the private sector,
others view governmental action more cynically as involving expres-
sions of the narrow self-interest of the relevant decisionmakers. It is
this special-interest-group-oriented vision of government 51 that Ma-
cey's razor characterizes as the more cynical.
Macey's razor is not based on the assumption that all governmen-
tal action is predicated on nefarious motives, but on the supposition
that government functions optimally when political initiatives are in-
terpreted from a cynical perspective. The premise for this insight is
simple: government in general and laws in particular are necessary
because human beings cannot regulate their own actions. However,
because laws are made by human beings who compose the govern-
ment, political regulation and legislative restraint are critical. Because
cynicism about government provides these constraints, adopting the
perspective that Macey's razor counsels is sound policy. Another rea-
son that it is advisable to adopt the perspective counseled by Macey's
razor is that government action necessarily displaces private action,
and displacing voluntary initiatives to solve social problems has devas-
tating consequences, including the twin evils of rampant corruption
and governmental excess. Moreover, as the following section of this
Article demonstrates, cynicism about human nature explains the basic
architecture of the U.S. Constitution.
III
CONSTITUTIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
CYNICISM ABOUT GovERNMENT
Cynicism about government is ubiquitous. As I observed previ-
ously, "[too often the [political] process seems to serve only the
purely private interests of special interest groups at the expense of the
broader public interests it was ostensibly designed to serve."52 It ap-
pears, however, that cynicism about government is not constant over
time. Rather, it seems that distrust of government reigns supreme
during periods of peace and economic stability, while people become
desperate for government-driven solutions during crises. This desper-
ation creates windows of opportunity for entrepreneurial politicians
and special interest groups, because such desperation induces people
to abandon cynicism and embrace the fantasy that the government
51 ROBERT E. McCoRMICK & ROBERT D. TOLLISON, PoLITIcIANs, LEGISLATION, AND THE
ECONONMY AN INQUIRY INTO THE I=NTREsr-CRouP THEORY OF GOVERNMENT 3-11 (1981).
52 Macey, supra note 5, at 223.
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will generate solutions to their problems.53 However, in calmer times,
people can craft constitutional rules that provide protections against
opportunistic politicians.
In this section of the Article, I will turn to constitutional theory
and the literature on social psychology to support my view that cyni-
cism about government should be encouraged for two reasons. First,
it reduces the incidence of bad law by stemming the flow of bills that
are enacted into law. Second, public cynicism improves the quality of
the laws that are passed.
A. Constitutional Theory
The U.S. Constitution reflects the Framers' views of human na-
ture as well as their profound cynicism about government. As James
Madison famously observed, "[i]f angels were to govern man, neither
external nor internal controls on government would be necessary."54
However, because the people who would be in charge of governments
were unlikely to be angels, strong protections against governmental
corruption and excess were necessary.55
In fact, the Framers took a very cynical view of human nature. As
Martin Diamond observed, cynicism was at the core of the new politi-
cal science embraced by the Framers:
Ancient and medieval thought and practice were said to have failed
disastrously by clinging to illusions regarding how men ought to be.
Instead, the new science would take man as he actually is, would
accept as primary in his nature the self-interestedness and passion
displayed by all men everywhere and, precisely on that basis, would
work out decent political solutions.5 6
Indeed, the miracle of the U.S. Constitution is that it adopted a realis-
tic, that is to say cynical, view of human nature. As Madison observed,
the Constitution was designed to reflect the fact that "[e]nlightened
statesmen will not always be at the helm" of the fledgling republic. 57
The Framers recognized that corrupt, short-sighted, and venal politi-
cians and bureaucrats were a serious threat to the new republic. Fail-
ure to instill a high level of cynicism in the citizenry would inevitably
53 See ROBERT HIGGs, CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN: CRICAL EPISODES IN THE GROWTH OF
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 17 (1987);Jonathan R. Macey, Regulation and Disaster: Some Observa-
tions in the Context of Systemic Risk, in BROORINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES
405, 413 (Robert E. Litan & Anthony M. Santomero eds., 1998).
54 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
55 See, e.g., id. ("In framing a government which is to be administered by men over
men... you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next
place oblige it to control itself.").
56 This passage appears with attribution, but without citation in Moynihan, supra note
7, at 23.
57 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 80 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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have led to the same problems of faction and interest-group politics
that created massive problems among the various pre-Revolutionary
War state governments.
As Alexander Hamilton observed in The Federalist No. 15, the rea-
son that people need government is that "the passions of men will not
conform to the dictates of reason and justice without constraint."58
The Constitution's purpose was to constrain government actors. The
Framers recognized that cynicism was a critical element of justice be-
cause they understood that, while it would be a "happy" event if deci-
sionmakers (including themselves) were "directed by a judicious
estimate of our true interests, unperplexed and unbiased by consider-
ations not connected with the public good," such a rosy view of the
constitutional formation process was "a thing more ardently to be
wished than seriously to be expected." 59
It is hard to be more cynical than Hamilton, who viewed men as
"ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious,"60 yet John Jay went even fur-
ther in The Federalist No. 4, when he attributed war to a "disgraceful"
aspect of human nature. 61 According to Jay, "nations in general will
make war whenever they have a prospect of getting anything by it."62
Thomas Sowell observes that the Framers do not attribute wars to
"misunderstandings," as pacifists claimed throughout the twentieth
century, and that "wars are not going to be prevented by 'seeing
others as people like ourselves' or by symbolic acts of goodwill. Wars
are prevented by making it too dangerous for others to attack you. ' 6 3
Conversely, according to Hamilton, a weak nation "forfeits even the
privilege of being neutral."64 In other words, Macey's razor applies
not only to domestic politics, but to foreign policy as well.
This point is recognized by other scholars as well. Bruce Acker-
man observed that the great insight of the Framers of the U.S. Consti-
tution was the cynical view that "the future of American politics will
not be one long, glorious reenactment of the American Revolution." 65
Similarly, Cass Sunstein asserted that the problem of interest group
control over government has been "a central concern of constitu-
tional law and theory since the time of the American Revolution." 66
58 THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 110 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
59 THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 33 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
60 THE FEDERALIST No. 6, at 54 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
61 THE FEDERALIST No. 4, at 46 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
62 Id.
63 Thomas Sowell, The Federalist Papers Revisited (Jan. 2, 1997), at http://
iv.tonhall.com/thcc/content/sowell/soweOlO297.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2001).
64 THE FEDERALIST No. 11, at 87 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
65 Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lecutures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE LJ.
1013, 1020 (1984).
66 Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STA. L. REv. 29, 29
(1985).
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The Constitution contains a wide variety of mechanisms that re-
flect the Framers' cynicism. In particular, the constitutional system of
checks and balances, of which the separation of powers is the most
prominent part, reflects a healthy cynicism about government. Rather
than assuming that government will consistently generate benign laws
and regulations, the constitutional structure raises politicians' costs of
passing laws in a variety of ways. Moreover, the Constitution's con-
straints on the legislative process are structural in nature, making
them relatively immune from opportunistic misinterpretations by sub-
sequent political actors.
One example of a structural feature of the Constitution that re-
flects cynicism is the bicameral legislature with significant differences
in the size of the two houses.6 7 The fact that the House of Representa-
tives is quite large and that there is a significant disparity between the
size of the House and the size of the Senate is rather significant. As
Mancur Olson explains, the cost of decisionmaking by a collective
body such as a legislature increases nonlinearly.68 This means that the
costs of making decisions increase at a faster rate than the growth in
the size of the legislature. 69 The implication of this analysis is that,
holding the total number of representatives (senators and congress-
men) constant, increasing the size of the House of Representatives
raises an interest group's costs of obtaining agreement in that cham-
ber by an amount greater than the group's savings in the other
house.70
It is also well known that the independent judiciary71 and the
presidential veto 72 are features of the U.S. Constitution that reflect
cynicism about the merits of unfettered governmental activity. These
structural features are not random. The bicameral legislature, the rel-
ative sizes of the House and Senate, the independent judiciary, and
the executive veto all raise the costs of passing legislation. The benefit
of such a system is that it reduces the efficacy of interest group activity.
67 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; id. art. I, § 3, ci. 1.
68 MANCUR OLSON, THE LoGcC OF COLLECTrIVE ACION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY
OF GROUPS 53-54 (1965).
69 See id.
70 MCCORMICK & TOLLISON, supra note 51, at 44-45.
71 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) ("Th[e] independence of the judges is ... requisite to guard the Constitution
and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humors which the arts of design-
ing men ... have a tendency... to occasion dangerous innovations in the government
... ."); see also Macey, supra note 5, at 266-68 (examining the independent judiciary from
an interest group perspective).
72 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 443 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (basing the need for the presidential veto on the fact that "the love of power
may sometimes betray [the legislature] into a disposition to encroach upon the rights of
other members of the government [and] a spirit of faction may sometimes pervert its
deliberations").
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The downside is that these features make it more difficult for less cyni-
cal politicians to pass laws. The Framers were clearly aware of this
downside, but were convinced that the benefits of cynicism out-
weighed the costs:
It may perhaps be said that the power of preventing bad laws
includes that of preventing good ones; and may be used to the one
purpose as well as to the other. But this objection will have little
weight with those who can properly estimate the mischiefs of that
inconstancy and mutability in the laws, which form the greatest
blemish in the character and genius of our governments.... The
injury which may possibly be done by defeating a few good laws will
be amply compensated by the advantage of preventing a number of
bad ones.73
Thus, the Framers would not view cynicism about government as
a social problem, but as a realistic, sensible, and constructive public
policy perspective. The danger is not too much cynicism, but too
much idealism. Pure Marxism probably is the most idealistic form of
government, and it has not exactly been a resounding success in Rus-
sia, Eastern Europe, North Korea, Cuba, or any other venue. In the
United States, however, where cynicism about government reigns su-
preme, people barely trust the government to act as silent guardian
over markets, and the result has been incredible prosperity.
B. Social Psychology and Cynicism
Just as economic theory fueled the public choice analysis of con-
stitutional theory above, the field of social psychology is similarly prov-
ing to be a rich source of insights into law. For example, the prospect
theory, developed by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, predicts
that people will not respond rationally to the risks of low-probability
events.74 In general, people will tend to either underestimate a rela-
tively high-probability risk, or to overestimate a relatively low-
probability risk.75 This cognitive bias permits opportunistic politicians
and interest groups to exploit rationally ignorant citizens by convinc-
ing them that costly, draconian legislation is necessary to address low-
probability risks. The overestimation of low-probability risk also seems
to explain the incredible success of government-sponsored lottery pro-
grams. These programs are highly regressive taxing vehicles that prey
upon people of modest means by taking advantage of their cognitive
73 Id. at 443-44.
74 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLO-
GIST 341, 343-45 (1984).
75 See id. at 345 (presenting illustrations of people demonstrating risk-seeking behav-
ior when confronted with unlikely gains and risk averse behavior when threatened with
unlikely losses).
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biases, which, in this case, manifest themselves in the form of their
hopes for winning the lottery.
Entrepreneurial politicians can gain public support by creating
the specter of an imminent crisis and then claiming that they have a
legislative solution. Unfortunately, this "solution" generally takes the
form of some costly and wasteful regulation which only transfers mas-
sive government funds to lawyers, lobbyists, bureaucrats, and special
interest groups who provide political support to the entrepreneurial
politicians.
For this reason, disasters provide entrepreneurial politicians with
the opportunity to gain public support by "taking charge of [a] disas-
ter" and claiming that they can "enact legislation that will reduce the
probability that such a disaster will occur in the future. '76 Perhaps
worst of all, governmental actors even have an incentive to create arti-
ficial disasters in order to stimulate demand for or reduce opposition
to regulations that they favor.
Unfortunately, as I observed in the context of regulating the fi-
nancial services industry, the regulation that follows a disaster often
bears no relation to the remedy needed to respond to the disaster.
Instead, such legislation responds only to the interests of discrete,
highly organized groups that are able to exploit the panic and con-
comitant suspension of cynicism toward government that frequently
follow a disaster. As I observed previously:
Not surprisingly, one of Congress's responses to the widespread
public sentiment and outrage that accompanies disaster is the pro-
mulgation of legislation that conforms to the needs of narrow, fo-
cused interest groups that advocate misplaced regulation as a
response to public attention on the current disaster. Interest
groups can bring about drastic regulatory change in a fraction of
the time normally required to pass such regulation as a result of the
public outrage to the disaster. 77
For example, the congressional hearings that followed the col-
lapse of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) cre-
ated the false impression that the U.S. banking system faced a massive
threat from rogue international bankers. 78 Despite the fact that no
U.S. creditors lost money when BCCI became insolvent (indeed, the
U.S. government made over $250 million in profits in the form of
76 Macey, supra note 53, at 415.
77 id, at 416.
78 At the congressional hearings, Senators Kerry and Brown argued that BCCI was a
.'case study of the vulnerability of the world to international crime on a global scope that
is beyond the current ability of governments to control.'" Id. at 420 (quoting JOHN KERRY
& HANK BROWN, THE BCCI AMAR, S. Doc. No. 102-140, at 17 (1993)).
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"fines" levied on the insolvent bank),79 the collapse of BCCI was used
to garner support for the Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act
of 1991 (FBSEA).80 This statute did not make banks safer, but it did
benefit domestic banking interests by raising entry barriers to U.S.
banking markets by foreign competitors.81 Of course, cynicism about
the motives of government can be a healthy antidote to this problem.
Another captivating insight from the literature on social psychol-
ogy is that people appear to have a fairly strong sense of innate fair-
ness (remember that this Article advocates cynicism only toward
government actors, not toward private individuals). This sense of fair-
ness, which makes some economists uncomfortable, sometimes
manifests itself in redistributionist tendencies.
Social psychologists have used an interesting experiment called
the "ultimatum game" to test these impulses.8 2 One of the classic ways
of structuring the ultimatum game is to have two people who do not
know each other, and who are guaranteed that they will never come to
know each other, play under conditions that maintain their anonym-
ity. Both players are told that they will be able to split a sum of money
(let us assume $100) if they can "win" the game by cooperating with
each other. One of the two players ("Player 1") is then informed that
she may either take the entire $100 for herself, or take only a portion
of it and share the rest with her partner ("Player 2"). Before Player 1
decides how much of the $100 she will take for herself, she is told that
Player 2 will be offered the balance of the $100 that Player 1 decides
to share. If Player 2 is unhappy with the sharing arrangement pro-
posed by the first player, he may reject his share, in which case Player
1 will also receive nothing. In other words, Player 2 can "punish"
Player 1 if she does not make a fair split by preventing Player 1 from
receiving anything. Of course, when this happens, Player 2 is also
punishing himself, because by rejecting Player l's split, he too receives
nothing.83
The surprising thing about the ultimatum game is that while eco-
nomic theory predicts that the second party should accept any
amount offered by the first party that is greater than zero, the second
party generally will reject offers that might be described as insultingly
low, such as offers below about $20, or twenty percent of the total
79 See Sturge v. Smouha (In re Smouha), 136 B.R. 921, 926 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992);
Macey, supra note 53, at 419.
80 12 U.S.C. § 3104 (1994). For a detailed account of the events leading up to the
passage of the FBSEA, see Macey, supra note 53, at 420.
81 Macey, supra note 53, at 420.
82 See, e.g., ChrisineJolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REv. 1471, 1489-90 (1998).
83 Id.
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available amount.84 Even more interesting is the fact that Player 1
often anticipates this result and generally makes a rather generous
offer in order to protect her claim to at least some of the money.85
The implications of the ultimatum game are interesting and sub-
tle. First and foremost, it seems plausible that people not only have a
strong sense of fairness, but are also willing to punish others (and
themselves) to vindicate that sense. Importantly, however, the ultima-
tum game is played with "found money." Neither player can be said to
have "earned" the money, neither is more deserving than the other,
and neither can claim a greater share. By contrast, money that the
government distributes is earned by somebody and then taken from
him through taxation.
It seems clear that impulses similar to those at work in the ultima-
tum game are at work in government. If redistributionist tendencies
are observable in the ultimatum game, where such tendencies impose
real costs on the party seeking to send the message that failure to re-
distribute adequately is immoral, such tendencies are likely to be mag-
nified in the context of governmental wealth transfer programs when
the costs of redistribution to the bureaucrat or politician engaging in
the distribution are effectively zero. Put differently, the redistribu-
tionist impulses that are laudable in the context of the ultimatum
game are dangerous when exhibited in the context of governmental
programs. Again, cynicism about the motives and effects of govern-
ment can serve as a healthy antidote to unfettered, unchecked redis-
tributionist impulses. These impulses are likely to be made worse by
the fact that legislators and bureaucrats may infer unfairness when-
ever they witness undesirable outcomes. Due to hindsight biases, leg-
islators and bureaucrats may infer erroneously that such outcomes are
the result of systemic unfairness or the unwillingness of the rich to
share with the less deserving.
Another important psychological phenomenon, the tendency to
believe convenient fictions, may then come into play. Specifically,
those in a position to help the least advantaged may convince .them-
selves that it is unnecessary to take responsibility for underprivileged
members of society because of the convenient fiction that the govern-
ment will help those people. We are then left with the worst of all
worlds-a private citizenry that will not and a government that cannot
help the least advantaged.
Another cognitive bias that politicians appear to have exploited is
the "endowment effect." Endowment effects have been tested
through social science experiments that compare human subjects'
84 Id. at 1490.
85 See Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics, 83 AM.
ECON. REv. 1281, 1283-84 (1993).
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willingness to pay for certain goods with their willingness to accept
payment for those same goods.8 6 A rational economic actor should
not demand a higher price when selling a possession than he would
be willing to pay to purchase that item. In fact, however, we see that
people are generally unwilling to part with an item in their possession
without receiving a premium above what they would pay for the item
when it is in the possession of others. The gap between this relatively
low amount that people are willing to pay and the relatively high
amount that people demand for goods in their possession is referred
to as the endowment effect.87
As Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsch, and Richard Thaler have ob-
served, "[o] ne implication [of the endowment effect] is that individu-
als have a strong tendency to remain at the status quo, because the
disadvantages of leaving it loom larger than advantages."88 One can
infer from this that economists are wrong to assume that we can tell
how satisfied people are merely by tabulating their wealth. Instead,
satisfaction should be calculated by examining changes in a person's
condition relative to a neutral reference point. Similarly, we can infer
that people fear changes in condition that make them worse off more
than they value improvements or gains of a corresponding
magnitude. 89
When viewed from the perspective of government, the endow-
ment effect paves the way for an expansion of governmental power.
First, government represents itself as the guardian of people's rights
and possessions. By preying on people's exaggerated fears about the
risks of having their rights or possessions removed, government can
increase the demand for its own services. Welfare is a particularly
egregious example of this practice. The endowment effect contrib-
utes to the problem of welfare dependency because people view the
costs of removing themselves from welfare to be significant while they
simultaneously undervalue the benefits of moving into private-sector
employment. Thus, while it is easy for people to support welfare
transfer payments that target the neediest members of society, the en-
dowment effect demonstrates that welfare can become a trap as peo-
ple irrationally become averse to surrendering those payments, even
when they have concrete opportunities to improve their condition.
Of course, cynicism about government ameliorates this problem to
the extent that potential welfare recipients develop a healthy skepti-
cism about the government's ability to solve their problems.
86 See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, & Richard H. Thaler, The Endowment Effect,
Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, J. EcoN. PERSP., Winter 1991, at 193, 194.
87 The phenomenon has also been dubbed "status quo bias" or simply "loss aversion."
See id.
88 Id at 197-98.
89 See id at 199.
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Another way that the endowment effect can produce bad results
is attributable to the "framing effect." The framing effect leads peo-
ple to treat out-of-pocket costs more seriously than they treat opportu-
nity costs, while a rational economic actor should treat both costs as
equal.90 This phenomenon has important implications for people's
views about fairness and justice.91 For example, Kahneman, Knetsch,
and Thaler conducted a survey of Toronto and Vancouver residents to
test the interaction of the framing effect and people's views of fair-
ness. Subjects were told that a shortage of cars had developed and
were then asked whether particular responses to that shortage were
"fair" or not. One group was told that there was a shortage for a pop-
ular model of automobile, and that the shortage was causing a two-
month delay in delivery. This group was further told that in response
to the shortage, a dealer had raised his price to $200 above the manu-
facturer's suggested retail price (list price) for the automobile. Sev-
enty-one percent of respondents thought that this action was unfair,
while only twenty-nine percent of respondents thought it was
acceptable.92
By contrast, another group was told the same story about the
shortage of cars, but then was told that the dealer that had previously
sold cars at $200 below list price was now selling cars at list price. Their
conclusions about the fairness of the car dealer's actions change dra-
matically. Despite the fact that the economic event (a price increase
of $200) was the same, fifty-eight percent of respondents now said that
the dealer was behaving acceptably, while only forty-two percent
thought that the dealer was behaving unfairly in this situation.93
The point is that absent cynicism, government can dramatically
affect the popular acceptance or rejection of its policies simply by tak-
ing full advantage of its power to frame the issues as it prefers.
One might argue that private companies' capacity to take advan-
tage of the framing effect is also substantial, and that this type of cog-
nitive bias can be effective in advertising. For example, Thaler has
shown that businesses can take advantage of the framing effect when
they establish pricing policies. For example, when there is a disparity
between the prices charged to credit card customers and to cash cus-
tomers, retailers never frame the credit card price as a "surcharge,"
but instead refer to the cash price as a "discount."94
90 See id. at 203.
91 See id.
92 Id.; Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, & Richard Thaler, Fairness as a Constraint on
Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 Am. EcON. REv. 728, 732 (1986).
93 Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, supra note 86, at 203; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Tha-
ler, supra note 92, at 732.
94 Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. EcoN. BEHAV. &
ORG. 39, 45 (1980).
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However, the government's ability to achieve its intended results
by exploiting the framing effect is substantially greater than that of
private firms. Private-sector framing effects like the one described
above are not harmful or even misleading. These framing effects
merely put the best possible "spin" on a particular consumer choice.
Moreover, in the private-sector context, people internalize the entire
cost of their failure to overcome cognitive biases. Finally, there are
statutory and common law remedies against fraudulent and mislead-
ing commercial practices in the private sector that do not exist in law-
suits against the government.95
By contrast, the government's ability to take advantage of framing
effects is significantly greater than that of the private sector because
the government can establish entitlement programs that provoke peo-
ple's status quo bias and loss aversion. Government can also trigger
framing effects through monetary policy. Imagine that the economy
is heading into decline. Business profits are declining, unemploy-
ment is already high, and firms will have to cut wages in order to avoid
further layoffs. Studies testing the framing effect show that the vast
majority of people find cutting wages to be unfair.96 By contrast, if the
government utilizes its control over monetary policy to cause substan-
tial inflation, the company can accomplish its goal of reducing work-
ers' salaries more palatably by simply failing to increase wages at the
rate of inflation.97
The framing effect also provides an additional reason for why
sensible constitutional structures establish independent central banks
and then place control over monetary policy in the hands of those
banks.98 When central banks are not independent of the political pro-
cess, there are other inexorable pressures on politicians to inflate
their countries' currencies. Inflation is a form of taxation that politi-
cians can impose outside of the normal legislative process. The gov-
ernment can print money at no cost and then use the newly printed
money to buy goods and services at an initially low set of prices. Prices
then rise as people begin to re-spend the newly minted money. These
subsequent purchases cause inflation, which reduces the purchasing
power of the money that people hold. But the government has ac-
95 For example, lawsuits against private parties for consumer fraud or securities fraud
are common while such suits against the government are unheard of.
96 See Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, supra note 86, at 204.
97 For example, Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler found that 63% of respondents
thought decreasing wages and salaries by 7% to be unfair in an economy experiencing a
recession but no inflation. However, in an economy with an inflation rate of 12%, only
22% of respondents found increasing salaries by 5% to be unfair, even though this
amounts to a 7% decrease once the rate of inflation is taken into account. Id
98 Cf Stanley Fischer, Central-Bank Independence Revisited, Am. ECON. REv., May 1995, at
201, 202 ("The central bank has to be independent to ensure that its preferences rather
than those of society determine monetary policy.").
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quired real resources from the private sector through its initial
purchases, as if through a tax, with a tax rate proportional to the rate
of inflation. 99 Consequently, the framing effect may partially explain
why politicians seek to gain control over monetary policy and then
pursue inflationary policies.
C. Contestability
One explanation for the poor performance of government agen-
cies and public enterprises relative to their private-sector counterparts
is that the managers of public-sector enterprises "lack the high-pow-
ered incentives that are believed to prevail in private firms."100 These
public-sector managers differ from private-sector managers in three
important ways. First, there is often no clear way to measure the per-
formance of public-sector actors because their goals are relatively
amorphous. In other words, while it is easy to determine whether a
private-sector firm is achieving its goal (making a profit), it is difficult
to discern the goals of a public-sector agency. Determining whether
those goals are being met may be impossible.
Second, while private-sector firms generally will have either a sin-
gle owner or multiple owners (shareholders) with identical incentives
(profit maximization), public-sector firms have many principals. 101
For example, in the United States, a single agency may be answerable
not only to the executive branch or Congress and the courts, but also
indirectly to the media, organized lobbyists, professional associations,
watchdog groups, and taxpayers.
Finally, government agencies often provide services to constitu-
ents that are particularly ill-suited to either monitor the agencies' per-
formance or take steps to remedy bad performance. 10 2 These
constituents include poor people, minority groups, the sick, and the
elderly. Moreover, rational ignorance and other collective action
problems make it difficult for even well-educated citizens to effectively
monitor the performance of government. 10 3
One way to combat these problems is to make government con-
testable. Presumably, all politicians are concerned about is losing
elections. All else being equal, politicians who are perceived as cor-
rupt or incompetent are more likely to lose elections than those who
are perceived as honest and competent. Similarly, politicians who
99 Owen F. Humpage, Central Bank Independence, ECON. COMMENT. (Fed. Reserve Bank
of Cleveland), Apr. 1, 1994, at 1.
100 Avinash Dixit, Power of Incentives in Private Versus Public Organizations, 87 AM. ECON.
REv. 378, 378 (1997).
101 See id. at 379-81.
102 See id. at 378.
103 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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produce economic growth or are credited with producing economic
growth are more likely to be successful than politicians who either
cannot or do not produce such growth.
Two important insights emerge from these observations. First,
political freedom serves the important function of improving the in-
ternal market for political leadership by lowering the information
costs of monitoring performance and displacing existing rulers.10 4 As
the costs of monitoring and responding to government decline, pres-
sure on governmental actors to perform well increase. When a gov-
ernment denies civil liberties, political leaders can "successfully
consolidate their hold on power by keeping their countries poor and
depriving citizens of the means to organize opposition."'0 5
Second, this analysis of the relationship between civil liberties
and prosperity depends upon leadership being contestable. In other
words, civil liberties matter only if citizens live in a functioning democ-
racy in which the transaction costs of displacing an existing ruling coa-
lition are low. Where this is the case, elections operate in the political
realm precisely the same way that the market for corporate control
operates in the realm of corporate governance. Elections, like take-
overs, provide the means by which citizens use voting power to dis-
place inefficient or corrupt incumbent management.
This analysis of the roles of civil liberties and contestability of gov-
ernment deepens our understanding of cynicism's role in improving
the operation of government. After all, if we assume that government
is comprised of decent, honorable, competent people adequately po-
licing both themselves and the public, there is no need for public
monitoring or investigation. To the extent that governmental actors
are honest and competent, they certainly will not be harmed by civil
liberties and democratic contestability. However, for us cynics, public
monitoring and investigation are essential to a functioning
democracy.
CONCLUSION
This Article attempts to demonstrate that cynicism about govern-
ment is healthy. Cynicism is good public policy because it improves
the quality of the laws and regulations produced by government.
There should be no doubt, however, that there are real costs associ-
ated with cynicism about governmental behavior. However, in polit-
ics, as in all fields of human endeavor, first-best solutions simply
cannot be achieved, and we must accept the fact that compromise is
inevitable. Cynicism about government provides a tremendous bene-
104 Colombatto & Macey, supra note 13, at 618.
105 Id. at 619-20.
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fit by slowing down the production of laws and regulations. Admit-
tedly, some of the laws and regulations that are eliminated through
cynicism would have resulted in net improvements for society. How-
ever, the benefits of stopping bad laws and forcing the government to
fully articulate cogent justifications for the rules it does pass will sub-
stantially outweigh these costs.
The Framers well understood the need for cynicism to provide
some check on the arbitrary exercise of power. Indeed, the genius of
the Constitution is that it assumed a cynical view of human nature and
designed a system of checks and balances to confront this reality.
Since then, a host of insights about human nature from economics,
public choice, and social psychology have strengthened the sound po-
sition articulated by the Framers.
In addition to its system of checks and balances, the Constitution
reflects cynicism about the outcomes generated by government dur-
ing "ordinary" times in a number of other ways. Democracy attempts
to force politicians to work hard to produce high-quality policies by
making theirjobs contestable. Basic civil liberties, such as freedom of
assembly, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press all can be de-
fended on the grounds that they lower the transaction costs associated
with monitoring government and communicating political
wrongdoing.
Unfortunately, even with a secure system of checks and balances
and strong support for civil liberties, governmental corruption and
ineptitude remain serious problems. For this reason, it seems clear
that the quality of government will be improved dramatically if people
retain a high level of cynicism about government. Even more impor-
tantly, maintaining cynicism about government can help to avoid fu-
ture calamities, like those that have occurred during awful moments
in history when citizens suspend their cynicism and embrace the myth
that government can solve all of society's problems. Nazi Germany,
Soviet Russia, and Pol Pot's Cambodia are vivid examples of the hor-
rors that can occur when cynicism disappears and people trust the
government to create a utopia.
To bolster the constitutional system of checks and balances and
other efforts to reflect cynicism about government, I have proposed
Macey's razor, a variant of Occam's razor, as the best perspective for
lawyers and social scientists to adopt when analyzing public policy is-
sues. Macey's razor counsels social scientists to adopt the most cynical
explanation of data when confronted with multiple explanations for
the same governmental action. Abundant use of Macey's razor will
improve the quality of government by shifting the burden of persua-
sion to governmental actors and forcing them to justify proposed
regulations.
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